Abstract-As a result of its low costs and high degree of integration with other services, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has become very widely used, while Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is one of the most important protocols for providing the VoIP service. Since SIP is an open source code with a simple structure and high expansibility, SIP servers are more vulnerable to attack by SIP messages malformed in order to stunt the server, or by a flood of SIP messages causing server congestion or shutdown. The system proposed in this paper therefore has two functions; one is to filter malformed messages that conflict with the SIP protocol, and the other is to determine whether an SIP server is under flooding attack. This study used the Chisquare test, usually applied in statistics, to identify flooding attacks. The proposed system can automatically modify an SIP server's blacklist to deter an attacker's subsequent attempts.
INTRODUCTION
As network technology continues to develop, voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) has fast become widely used in many applications. VoIP is implemented over TCP/IP, so any TCP/IP security weakness could pose a threat to VoIP services, including most common flooding attacks. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [1] [2] [3] is an open source code defined on the application layer of the OSI model, with the main purpose of establishing, modifying and interrupting multimedia sessions.
The VoIP service basically contains user agents (UA) and servers. UAs refer to end user devices; they can be software applications or hardware, like SIP telephones. User agent clients (UAC) are the parties that initialize the connection, namely the caller, while user agent servers (UAS) are the callees. Every UA must register with an SIP server via a Register message. If a UA is authorized, the server will respond with a 200-OK message. In general, a server may start a validation procedure by responding with a 401-Unauthorized message with a nonce value in the header field of the message. The UA uses this nonce value to generate an encrypted digest and put it in the header field, and then re-transmits the Register message. Upon receiving the message, the server will compare the encrypted digest with the original digest and send the 200-OK response to the UA if no error is found. The registration procedure is shown in Fig. 1 . An SIP connection is established as shown in Fig. 2 . The UAC sends an Invite message to the SIP server, which passes the request to the UAS. Upon reception, the UAS begins a ring notification, while at the same time responding to the UAC through the SIP server with a 180-Ringing message. As the UAS answers the request, it sends a 200-OK message to the UAC, and the UAC then returns an Ack (acknowledgement) to the UAS. All SIP messages pass through an SIP server. Once the SIP connection is built, subsequent Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP) connection establishment and voice packet transmissions will not be made through the SIP server. When either the UAC or the UAS hangs up the phone, they will send a Bye message to the SIP server to indicate that the connection has been terminated. The SIP server will transmit the Bye message to the other party, and then forward a responding 200-OK message. Every SIP message contains a command line, a header and a body. The command line is used to confirm the type of message. There are six types of requests, and six types of responses. The six types of request message include Invite, Bye, Ack, Options, Cancel and Register, while the six types of response message are usually represented by codes including 1XX (notification response, for example 180-Ring), 2XX (success response, such as 200-OK), 3XX (call forward response), 4XX (call failed, such as 401-Unauthorized), 5XX (server failure) and 6XX (global failure). The Invite message also contains information for performing Session Description Protocol (SDP) [4] , which includes the caller's media format, address, port, etc. The callee can accept or reject the connection request.
SIP has a simple structure with high expansibility; however, SIP servers are vulnerable to malformed SIP messages and flooding SIP messages. Therefore, the system proposed in this paper has two main functions. One is to exclude malformed SIP messages from the SIP server that conflict with the SIP protocol and the other is to determine whether the SIP server is under flooding SIP message attack.
This paper is an extension of the preliminary research work presented in [5] , where a prototype of SIP flooding detection was addressed. In this paper, the proposed system is meant to be installed in the SIP server, and applies the RFC 3261 [3] SIP standard format as the basis for identifying malformed packets. Moreover, if the amounts of SIP Invite/Cancel/Bye messages are greater than the normal SIP message thresholds, the system will invoke Chi-square test [6] to determine whether the SIP server is under flooding attack. In other words, the proposed system aims to identify any user who sends malformed SIP messages or floods a large number of Invite/Cancel/Bye to the SIP server. Whenever an attacker is identified, the system will update the blacklist in the SIP server in order to reject the caller's future connection requests. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, related works and the Chi-square test technology are introduced. In Section 3, the details of the proposed system are presented. In Section 4, experiment results and comparisons with other studies are shown. Finally, in Section 5 conclusions are given.
II. BACKGROUND
This section introduces attacks using malformed SIP messages and SIP message flooding, and describes the Chi-square test technology used in this study.
A. Related Research
In a malformed message attack, an attacker modifies SIP messages into anomalous forms and sends them to an SIP server. As the server cannot process such malformed messages, the result could be resource depletion or server shutdown. In Fig. 3 , the left hand side shows a normal Invite message, while the right hand side shows a malformed Invite message where the Invite field should not be Null. As in the methods proposed in [7] [8] [9] [10] , when the received SIP packet is inconsistent with the norms stipulated in RFC3261 [3] , it will be regarded as an attack. Today, the most common SIP attacks take the form of flooding attacks, in which a large number of SIP Invite/Cancel/Bye messages are sent to the SIP server, intended to slow or even shut the server down. Based on the facts that UAs must frequently register with a server in order to update their location, and that the server should respond with an OK message, Chen et al. [11] established a white-list to prevent attacks from unregistered users. The authors in [12] [13] [14] used finite state machines to simulate the various states of the SIP protocol; when repetitions of a certain state are beyond the set threshold, this could indicate a flooding attack. Zhou et al. [15] focused on protecting SIP register servers from CPU-exhausting DoS attacks, because register servers must perform identity confirmation and decryption/encryption computation. When connection requests increase considerably, the proposed mechanism will check the record of previous legitimate calls. If the suspect UAC is not in the list of legitimate calls, it will be regarded as an attacker, and the services will be blocked. The authors in [15] applied the Bloom filter algorithm [16, 17] to record and check users' IP addresses. The Bloom filter is a lightweight algorithm that consumes very little CPU resources.
Geneiatakis et al. [18, 19] also applied the Bloom filter algorithm to determine whether an SIP server is under a DoS attack. They used the Bloom filter algorithm to count the number of Invite messages, and corresponding responses. If the Invite messages and the response messages differ significantly in number, it is regarded as a flooding attack. Akbar et al. [20] compared the three algorithms, i.e., the adaptive threshold algorithm [21] , the cumulative sum algorithm [21] and the Hellinger distance algorithm [22] . According to the experiment results in [20] , the Hellinger distance algorithm exhibited the best performance in dealing with INVITE flooding.
B. Chi-square test
This section briefly introduces the Chi-square test [6] adopted in this study to implement the SIP message flooding detection function. In statistics, there are two types of data, quantitative and categorical. One of the main techniques for processing categorical data is the Chi-square test. The goodness-of-fit test of the Chisquare test is to figure out the approximation of observed frequency and expected frequency of the null hypothesis H0 in order to determine whether it meets a specific distribution. In other words, it finds the differences between the observed frequency obtained and the expected frequency assuming the null hypothesis H 0 is supported. The chi-square value of the Chi-square test, say x 2 , is calculated as follows:
where O i and E i (= n  p i ) are the observed frequency and expected frequency of sample group i, respectively; k is the number of categories, n is the number of samples, and p i is the probability of categories i. , the subscript "k-m-1" is called the degree of freedom (short for df) and the α presents the error tolerance. Since no population parameter should be estimated in advance, i.e., m = 0 and thus df is simplified to k -1. Moreover, α was set to 0.05 in this study because α is set to 0.05 as well in general situations, representing a 5% tolerance of error. The Chi-square critical values 2 1, km x   can be found from Table I [6] One application of the Chi-square test is given, for example, as follows. Consider tossing a dice 300 times. The frequencies of each point from 1 to 6 are 40, 60, 60, 45, 45 and 50, respectively. Is the dice a fair one? The null hypothesis H 0 here is that "it is a fair dice". According to Eq. (1), chi-square value computation in detail is as shown in Table II , and the final chi-square value is 7.0308. In this case, no population parameter must be estimated in advance, i.e., m = 0 because it is known that there are six faces, and each expectably has the same probability. The number of categories k is 6, so
Under the error tolerance rate α set to 0.05, from 
III. PROPOSED SYSTEM
A. System Framework Fig. 4 shows the system architecture. Basically, the proposed system is able to drop malformed SIP messages and deter Invite/Cancel/Bye flooding. Any incoming SIP message must first pass the Malformed Message Detection module. Once a message is determined to be malformed, the proposed system will update the black-list in the SIP server to block further connections from that user. The SIP message then passes the Chi-square test module, which determines whether the SIP server is under flooding attack. Similarly, if the module determines a flooding attack is taking place, it will store the relevant user information in the database and update the black-list in the SIP server to block further connections by that user. The Malformed Message Detection module is implemented according to the principles stipulated in RFC 3261 [3] , also shown in Appendix A. If the format of the incoming SIP message is inconsistent with the norms, it is regarded as a malformed attack. This function is mainly conducted by string comparison. This section thus focuses on the second module for detecting flooding attacks by Chi-square test. The basic principle is that if the numbers of different types of SIP messages are consistent with the expected proportional distribution, the connection is regarded as normal; otherwise, it is regarded as abnormal. Table I , the module will regard it as a flooding attack and update the SIP server's built-in blacklist to block that specific user. For example, assuming the normal number of SIP Invite message in a time unit is 20, the system will count the number of SIP Invite messages for every time unit and only invoke the Chi-square test procedure if the number is larger than 20.
The implementation of the Chi-square test module consists of three elements: feature selection, thresholds for normal SIP messages, and the Chi-square test procedure. The first two parts need to be performed in advance, i.e. in the training phase. First, in feature selection, the module needs to decide what kinds of features derived from SIP messages can be used to help identify flooding attacks. Second, the module must determine SIP feature threshold numbers for every time unit, i.e., threshold numbers below which there is no suspicion of flooding attack. Since the Chi-square value computation takes time to perform, if SIP messages do not outnumber these normal thresholds, the proposed system will not start the computation. Third, the module accumulates the numbers of SIP features for every time unit. If the numbers are below the thresholds, it concludes that there is no flooding, otherwise, the module applies the Chi-square test for further examination. Detailed descriptions of these three phases are given below.
B. Feature Selection
All features applied in the proposed system are given in Table III . As a caller initializes an Invite message, the callee may respond with a message, depending on their status. If the callee is online, they will respond to the caller via the SIP server with the Ringing message. If the callee is offline, the SIP Server will send a Code183 message to notify the caller, and the caller will then respond to the SIP server with an Ack message. If the callee is online \ut busy, the callee will respond to the SIP sever with a Code468 message, and the SIP server will then sends a Code183 to the caller, who will respond with an Ack message. A Cancel message ends the connection initiated by either communication party, and Code487 followed by OK are the SIP server's responses after receiving the Cancel message. Bye is sent by the communication party who wants to end the connection, and OK is the system response message.
The proposed system must count the number of SIP features for every time unit. Only if the numbers are greater than the thresholds will the system enable the Chisquare test function. Basically, the thresholds are the number of hourly calls based on normal weekday call rates, including the number of Invite, Cancel and Bye messages. By adding summing the call numbers over the same period each day, the average μ and standard deviation σ are obtained by Eq. (2) and Eq. (3), respectively. This study sets the threshold of each hour as μ + 3σ, which has been broadly used in the statistics field [6] . 
C. Thresholds for Normal SIP Traffic
The call number counting in this study is accumulated, i.e., the threshold of the first hour is computed by the number of Invite/Cancel/Bye messages during the period from 0:00 am ~ 1:00 am, the threshold of the second hour is computed by the number of Invite/Cancel/Bye messages in the period from 0:00 am ~ 2:00 am, and so forth. It is noted that all users have their own thresholds. So, for every user, there are 24 thresholds in one day. In operation, the proposed system will use the corresponding threshold value according to the time of the detection event.
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During the online test stage, the proposed system counts the number of each feature in every time unit, 3 seconds for example. If any feature number, i.e., Invite/Cancel/Bye, is greater than its threshold as defined above, the system will start the Chi-square test module to perform further investigation. If its chi-square value is greater than the Chi-square critical value, the caller will be regarded as a flooding attacker, and the system will update the SIP server's built-in black-list automatically in order to block that user. The Invite/Cancel/Bye Chisquare tests are illustrated as follows.
D. Invite Message's Chi-Square Value Computation
There are three types of messages related to the Invite message, #Invite, (#Code183 + #Ringing), and (#Ack + #Ringing). In the Chi-square test, the number of categories k is three, which means the degree of freedom (df) is k -1 = 2. Under the hypothesis of the 5% error tolerance, i.e., α=0.05, the Chi-square critical value, from In the computation of the chi-square value, this study sets Eext = (#Invite + (#Code183 + #Ringing) + (#Ack + #Ringing) -# (Code183|486) -#(Ack|486)) × 1/3, as the callee may be in one of the three possible states. If the callee is online, the SIP server sends a Ringing message to the caller, resulting in #Invite: (#Ringing): (#Ringing) = 1: 1: 1, then Eext = (#Invite + (#Ringing) + (#Ringing)) × 1/3. If the callee is offline, the SIP server sends a Code183 message to the caller, which sends Ack to the SIP server, resulting in #Invite: (#Code183): (#Ack) = 1: 1: 1, then, Eext = (#Invite + (#Code183) + (#Ack)) × 1/3. Finally, if the callee is busy, the SIP server sends a Ringing message to the caller, resulting in (#Invite): (#Ringing): (#Ringing) = 1: 1: 1. In addition, the callee will send a Code486 message to the SIP server, and the SIP server will send Code183 to the caller, which sends Ack to the SIP server. Since Code486 triggers Code183 and Ack, for ease of distinction they are presented as (Code183|486) and (Ack|486).
In summary of the above three cases, we have #Invite: (#Code183 + #Ringing): (#ACK + #Ringing) = 1: 1: 1, and Eext = (#Invite + (#Code183 + #Ringing) + (#Ack + #Ringing) -#(Code183|486) -#(Ack|486)) × 1/3. Therefore, when performing the Invite Chi-square test, by counting the number of SIP related messages including #Invite, (#Code183 + #Ringing), and (#Ack + #Ringing) in one time unit, it is possible to compute the chi-square value x 2 as follows:
Otherwise, it is considered an Invite flooding attack, and the current #Invite is set as the threshold of that user in order to prevent the continuous increase of the chi-square value due to the number of Invites increasing.
E. Cancel Message's Chi-Square Value Computation
As with the computation of the Invite Chi-square value, three types of Cancel-related messages are considered: Cancel, Code487, and OK. In general, (#Cancel): (#Code487): (#OK) = 1: 1: 1, Eext = ((#Cancel) + (#Code487) + (#OK)) ×1/3, the computation of Chisquare value x2 is as shown in: Otherwise, it is considered a Cancel flooding attack and the current #Cancel is set as the Cancel threshold of that user.
F. Bye message's Chi-Square Value Computation
The method here is similar to the above two cases, using three Bye-related messages: Bye (caller sends), OK, and Bye (SIP-server sends). In general, #Bye: #OK: #Bye = 1: 1: 1, Eext = ((#Bye) + (#Bye) + (#OK)) ×1/3, the Chi-square value x2 is computed as follows: otherwise it is considered a Bye flooding attack, and the current number of #Byes is set as the Bye threshold of that user.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND DATA ANALYSES
Four computers were used to construct the experimental environment. One played the attacker, launching flooding attacks; one played the SIP server containing the proposed system, and the other two played the UAC and UAS. The attacker computer was installed with SIPp [28] and SiVuS [25] in order to produce necessary traffic; several researches have also used this software for the same purpose, e.g., SiVuS in [25] [26] [27] and SIPp in [15, [28] [29] [30] [31] . Elastix [23] was used for the VoIP server, and the proposed detection system was coded in JAVA and JNETPCAP [24] . JNETPCAP provides the online packet capturing function. The two computers simulating the UAC and UAS were installed with SIPp. First, the normal traffic flow of each user created by SIPp was collected. The SIPp tool simulated 50 users as UACs, and each user supposedly called 10 to 30 times, randomly, in a day. The number of calls during every hour for each user was recorded in order to set the normal thresholds.
A. Malformed SIP Messages Detection
Malformed messages are messages in violation of the SIP message format stipulated in RFC 3261 [3] . Testing tools SiVuS and SIPp were applied to produce malformed messages and send them to the SIP server. In this study, the anomalous SIP message tests were conducted in four scenarios, as shown in Table IV . Scenario_1 used SIPp, with a background flow volume of 0, to send 5200 malformed messages in 17 seconds, and the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) detection results were both zero. Scenario_2 used SIPp, with a background flow of 10 calls per second, to send 5200 malformed messages in 17 seconds, and the FP and FN instance detection results were 0 and 87, respectively. Scenario_3 used SiVuS, with a background flow of 0, to send 2500 malformed messages in 10 seconds, and the FP and FN detection results were both zero. Scenario_4 used SiVuS, with a background flow of 10 calls per second, to send 2500 malformed messages in 10 seconds, and the FP and FN instance detection result were 0 and 121, respectively. 
B. SIP Message Flooding Detection
Using SIPp to generate SIP Invite/Cancel/Bye message flooding, it is clear that the chi-square values increase as SIP message traffic increases. Fig. 6(a) shows the gradient increase in Invite/Cancel/Bye message transmission, and the corresponding chi-square values are illustrated in Fig. 6(b) . SIP message volume increases from 10 packets per second to 50 packets per second, while the chi-square value increases with the rising number of messages per second. When the chi-square value is beyond the critical value it is considered a flooding attack. In other words, chi-square value computation is a kind of statistical method to effectively reflect the sudden increase of SIP messages.
On the other hand, Fig. 7(a) shows the gradient decrease in Invite/Cancel/Bye message transmission, and the corresponding chi-square values are given in Fig. 7(b) . SIP message volume decreases from 50 packets per second to 10 packets per second, while the chi-square value decreases with the decreasing number of messages per second. Fig. 8 shows that the chi-square values correspond to the situation when the transmission volume of Invite/Cancel/Bye messages remains high. 
C. Comparisons with other Researches
This study concerns SIP servers facing malformed message attacks and flooding attacks. Malformed message detection uses the SIP format specifications in RFC 3261 to determine whether an SIP message is anomalous. SIP flooding attack detection finds corresponding messages and proportional relationships by SIP protocol and uses the Chi-square test to determine whether the SIP server is under an Invite, Cancel, or Bye flooding attack. The comparisons of inclusive functions with other relevant studies are given in Table V.   TABLE V. FUNCTION COMPARISONS WITH RELEVANT STUDIES V. CONCLUSIONS This paper proposed a method enabling an SIP server to detect and further prevent malformed SIP message attacks and SIP message flooding attacks. The malformed SIP detection was based on the norms in RFC326, while the SIP flooding detection applied the Chi-square test to identify the caller launching an attack in every time unit. The Chi-square test is used to determine the proportional relationship of certain response messages when an SIP connection is established, and the goodness-of-fit test of the Chi-square test is used to check whether the monitored messages meet the expected distribution, in order to identify a flooding attack. Extended experiments were conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed system. According to the experiment results, the proposed mechanism can detect malformed messages and any Invite/Cancel/Bye flooding attack. If an attack is identified, the proposed system is able to modify the SIP server's blacklist to stop future connections by that caller.
Extended experiments were conducted to show the effectiveness of the proposed system, and a comparison of inclusive functions with other studies has been provided. 
4
Each header field consists of a field name followed by a colon (":") and the field value.
5
A valid SIP request formulated by a UAC MUST, contain the following header fields: To, From, CSeq,Call-ID, MaxForwards,and Via; 6
A request outside of a dialog MUST NOT contain a To tag; 7
The From field MUST contain a new "tag" parameter. 8
Cseq MUST be less than 2 31 
9
The protocol name and protocol version in the header field MUST be SIP and 2.0
10
The Via header field value MUST contain a branch parameter.
11
The branch ID inserted by an element compliant with this specification MUST always begin with the characters "z9hG4bK".
12
If more than one Via header field value is present in a response, the UAC SHOULD discard the message.
13
The Contact header field MUST be present and contain exactly one SIP or SIPS URI in request.
14 The Call-ID header field of the response MUST equal the Call-ID header field of the request.
15
The CSeq header field of the response MUST equal the CSeq field of the request.
16
The Via header field values in the response MUST equal the Via header field values in the request.
17
If a request contained a To tag in the request, the To header field in the response MUST equal that of the request.
